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Introduction 
New approaches adopted to tackle white collar crime have unsettled traditional 
commitments and assumptions about the operation of the criminal process. To 
begin with, more nuanced understandings of harm and ‘systems risks’ are 
emerging.1 A new governmental approach has emerged in light of the changing 
nature and perception of security risks and the emergence of more ‘networked 
governance’ strategies, employing a variety of mechanisms (civil, 
administrative and regulatory) in tandem with criminal law instruments. 
Technological changes and a recognition that the disequilibrium in power 
between the State and the accused is no longer as pronounced are also 
impacting. New investigative and prosecutorial networks are also emerging that 
in part rely on information gathering and information transfer beyond the 
traditional reach of the police and prosecution agencies. These changes are 
occurring against the backdrop of a delegation of power to an extensive range of 
specialist agencies with wide investigative powers and supported by a wide 
range of criminal sanctions available summarily and on indictment. There is 
also evidence of an increasing willingness to imprison individuals convicted of 
serious corporate crime.2 In this chapter we begin by examining the concept of 
white collar crime, including its scope, cause and consequences, before 
exploring some of the changes which are impacting upon traditional 
understandings of the criminal process and the changing nature of the power 
used by the state in its battle against white collar crime. 
1. Identity 
The concept of white-collar crime is ill-defined with attempts to accommodate 
white collar crime within the traditional discourse on crime proving challenging 
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in light of the contested nature of the concept and the tendency to define crime 
“according to a ‘real crime’ perspective”.3  Edwin Sutherland, a pioneer of 
white collar criminology, suggested that white collar crime was ‘a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of 
his occupation’,4 thus challenging the stereotypical assumptions about all crime 
being committed by the lower classes. This understanding of white collar crime 
maintains currency today, despite criticism.5 Shapiro suggests that it “rests on a 
spurious correlation between role-specific norms and the characteristics of the 
occupants of these roles”,6 conflating the perpetrators with their misdeeds and 
ultimately leading to "an unfortunate mixing of definition and explanation".7  
While Sutherland’s definition focuses on four elements, other elements might 
be ‘a violation of trust’8  and the ‘organisational’ or ‘economic’ attributes of 
white collar crime. It is clear that considerable disagreement exists about the 
range of misconduct that would fall within the definition. In order to avoid the 
straight-jacket of overly prescriptive accounts, some commentators have 
accordingly attempted to develop typologies of the forms of crime that may fit 
under the general penumbra of white collar crime. These include: financial 
offences (from share dealing to bribery to tax evasion); offences against 
consumers (price fixing, illegal sales, unfit goods); crimes against employees; 
and crimes against the environment.9 Green has suggested that the uncertainty 
surrounding this group of crimes can be attributed to the moral complexity and 
ambiguity in such offenses: 
“what is interesting and distinctive about this group of crimes is that, in a 
surprisingly large number of cases, there is a genuine doubt as to whether 
what the defendant was alleged to have done was in fact morally 
wrong…the question is whether the conduct engaged in was more or less 
acceptable behavior, at least in the realm in which it was performed, and 
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therefore, should not have been subject to criminal sanctions in the first 
place.”10  
 
If there are tensions in relation to the definition of white collar crime, it is also 
the case that there is no settled agreement on causation. Whilst there is 
consensus that 'theories of crime' that focus on poverty or poor socialisation 
cannot account for the phenomenon of white collar crime, no criminological 
approach has emerged to dominate the landscape.  Instead, a variety of 
approaches can be employed, the merits of which may vary depending on 
ideological standpoint or the circumstances of individual cases. To begin with, 
one can refer to ‘classicism or rational choice theory’. This approach 
presupposes that crime is based on calculative reasoning, in which the actor 
coldly weighs up the perceived benefits and ranges them against the expected 
costs (likelihood and consequences of detection). As Charles Murray, for 
example, notes: ‘…offenders are extremely pragmatic. Their calculations 
seemed to be based on a hard headed appreciation of the facts’.11 Proponents of 
this theory suggest that weak regulation or non-enforcement provides a fertile 
ground for white collar criminality. Some criminologists would suggest that 
white collar crime can be explained by ‘differential association’ i.e. criminal 
behaviour is learnt behaviour. If an individual is in an environment where there 
is a surplus of favourable dispositions to law violation over unfavourable 
dispositions, this may contribute to his or her involvement in crime.12 Sykes and 
Matza, argue that criminals also learn ‘techniques’ that enable them to ‘weaken’ 
the hold society places over them, and to justify their wrongdoing. These 
techniques act as defence mechanisms that discharge the wrongdoer from the 
constraints associated with moral order.13 Some also support the view that white 
collar crime is caused by ‘strain’. Structurally induced strain in society is 
created through an emphasis on economic success, the pursuit of individual self-
interest, competitiveness, and materialism. Aware of the disjunction between 
institutionalised aspirations (pressures to maximise profit, growth, efficiency) 
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and the availability of legitimate opportunities, white collar criminals will 
‘innovate’ in order to achieve institutional goals.14  
Another distinguishing feature of white collar crime is the impact of such crime 
on society. It is accepted, and recent experience in Ireland would support the 
contention,  that the ‘…financial cost of white collar crime is probably several 
times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily 
regarded as the ‘crime problem…’.15 The costs of crime investigated by the 
Revenue Commissioners far exceed the costs of street crime. The Whitaker 
Committee estimated that the losses incurred through white-collar crime in 1984 
were more than ten times the value of all stolen property recorded by the 
Gardaí. The total value of property stolen in burglaries, larcenies and robberies 
in 2002 was €97 million. In the same year, seven times as much money was 
collected as a result of investigations into just three waves of illegal activity 
involving some of Ireland’s most influential citizens.16 More significantly 
perhaps, Sutherland also emphasised the impact of such crime on society:  ‘The 
financial loss from white collar crime, great as it is, is less important than the 
damage to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create 
distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social disorganisation on a 
large scale. Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social institutions or 
social organisation.’17 
 
Despite this, it has long been felt that the rich and powerful are relatively 
immunised from the full reach of criminal law. Carson notes: ‘…The behaviour 
of persons of respectability and upper socio-economic class frequently exhibits 
all the essential attributes of crime but it is only very rarely dealt with as such. 
Systems of criminal justice favour certain economically and politically powerful 
groups and disfavour others, notably the poor and unskilled who comprise the 
bulk of the visible criminal population’.18  The crimes of the powerful remain at 
the margin of attention with censure aimed at a ‘disproportionate number of 
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those who are poor, uneducated and unskilled’.19 As Norrie suggests: ‘The 
cunning of the law lies in its ability to mask the one-sidedness of its 
instrumental content through its formal character as a logic of universal 
individualism’.20 
 
2. The Hegemony of State-Accused relations and ‘Crime in the Streets’ 
Justice.   
New approaches to tacking white collar crime unsettle traditional commitments 
and assumptions about the operation of the criminal process. These 
commitments and assumptions focused largely on ‘street crime’, emphasising a  
‘police – prosecutions – prisons’ way of knowing the justice system. Such an 
understanding has a long history. Beginning in the nineteenth century, a State-
accused model of justice emerged which significantly shaped how crime 
conflicts were presented, addressed, legitimated and concluded. It had a number 
of telling features. To begin with, it was organised around a centralised 
(constitutional) state and the ‘institutionalised fiction’ of the ‘public sphere as 
the central principle of its organisation’,21 both of which helped to promote  the 
sense of ‘civilized association’ and an ‘objectivated’  criminal process.22  The 
adversarial criminal trial − involving ‘a contest morphology’ that included oral 
presentation of evidence, lawyer led questioning, cross-examination by counsel, 
relative ‘judicial passivity’ during the guilt determining phase of the trial, and 
informational sources secured by both the prosecution and defence – 
exemplified this objective representation.23   
The crime itself was no longer viewed as a personal altercation, but a 
phenomenon that required an institutional response demarcated from emotive, 
subjective and personal references. In creating this ‘buffer zone between system 
and person [by establishing a] zone of indifference’24 between the lived 
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ontological experiences of the crime conflict and its effective administration, 
new imperatives could be foregrounded, particularly those that emphasised 
procedure, the ideological neutrality and rationality of the process, and its 
objectivated nature.25 Facticity, objectivity, rationality, and neutrality – 
coalescing with the filtering fiction of the ‘public interest’ – facilitated this drive 
from personal to institutional referents.26   
In addition the focus of criminal law moved away from the notion of ‘manifest 
criminality’ based on the disposition of the accused to a more formalised 
conception of criminal liability. As Habermas noted: ‘[t]he positivization, 
legalization, and formalization of law meant that the validity of law can no 
longer feed of the taken-for-granted authority of moral traditions’.27 This more 
codified approach to law also impacted on the image of the human subject who 
increasingly came to be constituted as a rational, autonomous and self-
governing being.28 
The State could draw upon the power of a centralised police force and a public 
prosecutor’s office which would gather and present evidence in the public 
interest. As states grew stronger in relation to the criminal process, an increased 
emphasis was placed on centralised bureaucracy and on the fairness and 
objectivity of the investigation, prosecution and adjudication. Garland 
succinctly captures this phenomenon:29  
The offender is defined as a legal subject, a citizen inscribed with rights 
and duties, entitled to equal treatment before the law. The State which 
punishes does so by contractual right in accordance with the terms of a 
political agreement. Its power to punish has its source in the offender’s 
action - it is the agreed consequences of a contractual breach. The State 
has here no intrinsic or superior right. It meets the citizen on terms of 
equality and must not encroach upon his or her rights, person or liberty 
except in circumstances which are rigorously and politically determined 
in advance - nulla poena sine lege. 
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 As a consequence, in part, of this process of State monopolisation, a discourse 
and practice of liberal legalism emerged (emphasising the universality, liberty 
and sameness of the individual person) to rebalance power relations in the 
justice arena. For the accused, this meant that the justice network was 
restructured to incorporate a clearer and more substantive body of due process 
rights that would guarantee, as far as practicable, both substantive and 
procedural justice. It also ensured that the State increasingly dissociated itself 
from local and informal networks of power.  
A State-accused logic of action thus came to cast a long shadow over criminal 
process relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  It defined the 
accused as the primary (exclusive) rights-bearer, with institutional practice 
heavily coordinated in accordance with this feature. The criminal law itself 
increasingly focused on a relatively narrow range of offences, constructing a 
very narrow view of criminal typology, giving the impression that it is only 
certain socio-economic classes that commit crime. This inevitably contained a 
‘disproportionate number of those who are poor, uneducated and unskilled’.30 
Indeed it has long been felt that the rich and powerful are relatively immunised 
from the full reach of criminal law.31 Criminal law teaching itself helped to 
inculcate a set of attitudes towards the legal system in society, exhorting in 
particular its legitimacy on the basis of its neutral nature, whilst ignoring the 
underlying structural inequalities of power which are imbricated in the cross-
currents of society. The ideology of objectivity, egalitarianism and the strict 
application of rules can mask and mystify law’s partiality, particularly its 
capacity to preserve and maintain the status quo for those in power.32 
The modern State-accused model of justice might also be described, in part, as 
an 1861 Offences against the Person way of knowing criminal wrongdoing. 
Such an approach focuses ‘personal references’ – assaults, homicides, sexual 
offences, criminal damage .  It was therefore very much rooted in ‘crime in the 
street’ harms to individuals. Regulatory wrongdoing was more ‘apersonal’ in 
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nature, and thus construed as having comparatively benign effects.33 The 
argument was that ‘these were not real crimes to which stigma should attach, 
but were rather in the nature of administrative regulations with non-stigmatising 
penalties such as fines’.34 Late modernity is challenging many of these 
assumptions. In the next section we explore some of the changes which are 
impacting upon traditional commitments and understandings of the criminal 
process. 
(i) Perceptions of Harm 
To begin with, more nuanced understandings of harm and ‘systems risks’ are 
emerging.35 As a result, distinctions traditionally drawn between crimes which 
are mala prohibita and mala in se are not as clear cut.36 Misconduct in the 
banking and corporate sectors, in the workplace, in the environment, in the 
political arena and in the distortion of competition in the market poses as much, 
if not more, of a threat to our everyday lives as ordinary crime, with the 
potential to affect more people. Our security can be affected in a myriad of 
different ways by misconduct of this nature including, among other things, 
workplace injuries, loss of equal opportunity, loss of competition, loss of jobs, 
loss of reputation and the consequent devaluation of share prices and pension 
funds, threats to the environment, increased taxation, and increased costs for 
consumers. 
(ii) New modes of governance 
There is also a new governmental approach involving the changing nature and 
perception of security risks and the emergence of more ‘networked governance’ 
strategies that employ civil, administrative and regulatory mechanisms 
alongside criminal law instruments. This extended, somewhat fluid, institutional 
arrangement is very different from the traditional bifurcated representation of 
wrongs as either civil or criminal harms, with almost mutually exclusive formal 
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processes for knowing and handling conflicts.37 These strategies are supported 
by a wide range of criminal sanctions available summarily and on indictment. 
Durkheim neatly captures this expansion in criminalisation, juxtaposing it with 
the decline in severity in penal punishments:38  
‘Seeing with what regularity repression seems weaker the further one 
goes in evolution, one might believe that the movement is destined to 
continue without end; in other words, that punishment is tending towards 
zero…For there is no reason to believe that human criminality must in its 
turn regress as have the penalties which punish it. Rather everything 
points to its gradual development; that the list of acts which are defined 
as crimes of this type will grow, and that their criminal character will be 
accentuated. Frauds and injustices, which yesterday left the public 
conscience almost indifferent, arouse it today and this insensitivity will 
become more acute with time.’  
The emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is significantly different 
from the unified monopolies of centralised control underpinning policing and 
prosecution in the modern State. Arguably these new techniques and strategies 
can be seen as part of a pattern of more, rather than less, governance, but taking 
‘decentred’, ‘at-a-distance’ forms.39 The number of administrative agencies that 
have entered the criminal justice arena, colonising the power to investigate 
regulatory crimes in specific areas and to prosecute summarily, has increased 
dramatically in Ireland in recent years. They include: the Revenue 
Commissioners, the Competition Authority, National Employment Rights 
Authority, the Director of Consumer Affairs, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Food Safety Authority, the Health and Safety Authority, and the 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement. Moreover, very wide powers 
of entry, inspection, examination, search, seizure and analysis are given to some 
of these agencies.  
This enlargement in scope, however, is fragmented and heterogeneous in nature, 
occupying diverse sites and modes of operation. Governance therefore is no 
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longer defined by centralising tendencies. Rather it is much more dispersed: ‘it 
flows through a network of open circuits that are rhizomatic and not 
hierarchical’.40 Information trails and information gateways cut across civil, 
administrative, criminal and regulatory domains of action, no longer limiting or 
fixing the reach and potential for effective intervention. In the same way that 
these new governance strategies seek to move beyond the limiting effects of 
over centralisation in policing and prosecution functions – and the fixity of 
traditional criminal law - they also cut across territorial boundaries. All of this 
involves a trend away from a hierarchical command and control apparatus of 
State policing and prosecution. It constitutes a new form of ‘networked 
governance’ involving the increasing ‘regulation of civil society’.41   
(iii) The decline in power of the Leviathan State 
The perception of the strong State ranged against a weak accused is also no 
longer as clear cut. When the State came to dominate the crime conflict, 
positioning itself as the only legitimate means of coercion, it imbalanced the 
equilibrium in power relations. Monopolisation of this kind recalibrated the 
circuits of governance,   resulting inter alia in the construction of l'égalité des 
armes to rebalance dissymmetries in power relations. The focus of the power - 
the subject accused of particular types of crime - was seen as vulnerable in that 
he or she was pitted against the unlimited resources of the Leviathan State. In 
this context, it is not surprising that a whole corpus of exclusionary rules and 
fairness of procedure rights emerged to ensure that the accused was afforded the 
best possible defence against unfair prosecution and punishment. Since, and to 
paraphrase Stephen, the State was so much stronger than the individual citizen, 
and was capable of inflicting so very much more harm on the individual than 
the individual could inflict upon society, it could afford ‘to be generous’.42  
This disequilibrium in power is no longer as pronounced. Sovereign nations are 
no longer the only large influential entities in the geo-political sphere. The rise 
of technology, the effects of globalisation and the relative autonomy of 
transnational corporations has also limited their power to have the last word on 
policy and strategic choices.43  Moreover, when the State accuses a corporation 
or corporate actor of white collar wrongdoing, it is often facing a party that is 
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possessed with excellent resources, often better than the State 
investigation/prosecution unit itself.44 There is therefore a resource parity that is 
not accounted for in traditional constructions of State-accused relations.  
(iv) Information Leverage and Information Access 
Prior to the centralisation of power in State police and prosecution forces, the 
old system of law enforcement was heavily reliant on local  networks involving 
rewards, victims, thief-taking and accomplice driven prosecutions. As the State 
increasingly began to monopolise investigative and prosecutorial functions 
during the nineteenth century, recourse to local networks was minimised. Where 
these practices continued – for example with informants – they were 
downplayed. In an industrialised setting, this system of enforcement was 
increasingly viewed as a ‘badly regulated distribution of power’.45  It was 
replaced with ‘public power’ which could be ‘distributed in homogeneous 
circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the 
finest grain of the social body’.46 The centralised state apparatus – as expressed 
through the police and public prosecutors – thus completely monopolised the 
crime conflict. Though it remains largely true of the investigation and 
prosecution of ‘ordinary’ offences, new regulatory approaches are beginning to 
throw up investigative and prosecutorial networks that in part rely on 
information gathering and information transfer beyond the traditional reach of 
the police and prosecution agencies.  
Aside from the fact that many regulatory  agencies have very strong powers to 
compel the production of information,47 legislation increasingly permits 
authorities including the Competition Authority, the Revenue Commissioners, 
the Insolvency Service of Ireland, the Director of Corporate Enforcement and 
the Irish Takeover Panel to share information with each other. In some 
instances, individuals are also required to become ‘information reporters’.48  
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Auditors, tax advisers, lawyers, accountants and liquidators are all bound by 
statutory requirements49 to report information to the relevant authorities.50 As 
McGrath notes:51  
The use of legal and accounting professionals reflected a significant 
orientation of who is expected to police corporate and white collar crime. 
Auditors, for example, were traditionally required to realign information 
asymmetries by providing investors with independent verification of the 
companies’ financial information….Recent initiatives, however, suggest 
that accounting and other professionals have transitioned from private 
watchdogs , reporting shareholders and directors, to public information 
shareholders, private police who wither prevent wrongdoing or report it 
after the fact for public protection.   
Very broad and generic obligations to disclose information have also recently 
been enacted in Ireland.52 Section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011, for 
example, makes it an offence for a person to fail to disclose information to An 
Garda Síochána as soon as practicable and without reasonable excuse, which the 
individual knows or believes might be of material assistance in preventing the 
commission or securing the apprehension of any other person for offences 
relating to banking and finance, company law, money laundering, theft, fraud, 
bribery, corruption, competition, consumer protection, cybercrime and tax 
collection 
In addition to facilitating exchange of information and compelling certain 
parties to become information reporters, the authorities are increasingly also 
seeking to protect and encourage witnesses to come forward and provide 
evidence. ‘Whistleblowers’ have been crucially important in Ireland on lifting 
the lid on various abuses such as the care of the elderly and corruption in banks. 
Encouraging such witnesses to provide information ordinarily takes two forms: 
protection and/or immunity. The Protected Disclosures Act 2014, for example, 
provides extensive protection for public sector workers in Ireland in respect of 
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wrongdoings such as health and safety threats, misuse of public monies, 
mismanagement by a public official, damage to the environment, or 
concealment or destruction of information relating to any of the foregoing.53 
Immunity programmes also exist.54  
These new circuits of information gathering are designed to overcome the 
challenges posed by white collar crime, which overwhelmingly occurs in 
private.55 They rely on new techniques and strategies – particularly the 
emphasis on legal compulsion  - which are often beyond the reach of traditional 
State/accused relations. There is an increasing tendency through these strategies 
to compel or facilitate disclosure. They are supported by the less restrictive 
information access that is available to many regulatory agencies via the civil 
process56 which also brings significant pressure to bear on the production of 
information. 
(v) The flow of power in to the civil sphere 
Finally, another striking feature of the changes occurring in the late modern 
criminal process is the proliferation of hybrid enforcement mechanisms that can 
be employed by the agencies or, on occasion, by private parties. These 
mechanisms have conflated the functional distinctions that exist between 
criminal and civil law.57 For example, and apart from the possibility of a 
criminal prosecution by the Competition Authority, private parties can seek to 
initiate civil enforcement of competition law under section 14(1) of the 
Competition Act, 2002. Section 8(10) of the same Act provides that an action 
under section 14 may be brought whether or not there has already been a 
criminal prosecution in relation to the matter concerned and, in addition, a 
section 14 action will not prejudice the initiation of any future prosecution. 
Similarly, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement can take civil or 
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criminal enforcement actions. Civil enforcement actions include the use of 
restriction and disqualification orders.58  
The increasing use of the civil jurisdiction as part of an array of strategies for 
contending with misconduct is well illustrated through the following vignette 
involving Thomas ‘Slab’ Murphy.59 Though never convicted of terrorist 
activity, he was allegedly an important figure in the South Armagh Brigade of 
the IRA in the 1970s and 1980s before being elected Chief of Staff of the IRA 
in 1997.60  His farm straddles County Armagh and County Louth, the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The British army 
observation towers along the Border hills were allegedly constructed, in part, to 
keep surveillance on Murphy’s IRA operations.61  In March 2006, it took 400 
British and Irish soldiers, PSNI and Garda officers and officials from the 
Criminal Assets Bureau and the British customs and excise to mount a dawn 
raid on his farm which is located on both sides of the border. The fortune he 
allegedly amassed through fuel laundering and smuggling pigs, cattle, grain and 
cigarettes has been estimated by the BBC’s Underworld Rich List at between 
£35 million and £40 million. Almost £200,000 in mixed currencies had been 
found on the land, in the house and in sheds, along with 30,000 cigarettes and 
8,000 litres of fuel. It also emerged that black bags hidden among hay bales in a 
cow shed contained cash of €256,235 and £111,185 and uncashed cheques 
worth €579,270, £80,000 and 24,000 in old Irish Punts. More than 30 archive 
boxes of documents, ledgers and cheques were seized on the farm along with 
computers and separate hard drives. In the yards, three tankers and a truck with 
a fourth tanker concealed inside it were impounded along with an oil laundering 
unit. Ultimately more than €625,000 in cash and cheques confiscated by 
Revenue chiefs in Ireland. Nine properties in north-west England, worth 
£445,000, were recovered by UK authorities. An agreed legal settlement took 
place in October 2008.62 In December 2015, Murphy was found guilty on nine 
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counts of tax evasion following a lengthy investigation by the Criminal Assets 
Bureau. In February 2016, he was jailed and sentenced to 18 months in prison.  
What is evident in this vignette is a mix of enforcement mechanisms, but with 
the civil tool acting as a very powerful instrument of control. It is premised on 
efficiency and as few restrictions as possible on fact finding.63 In raising a tax 
assessment, authorities in various jurisdictions have developed considerable 
powers to require a taxpayer to furnish details of earnings and assets, to obtain 
orders freezing monies and assets, and to seek information from third parties 
and financial institutions.64 Its appeal lies in its permanency and low visibility 
efficiency. This is copper fastened by the disequilibrium in power relations – 
the onus is very much on the subject of a tax audit to demonstrate compliance.  
The Murphy vignette also, however, displays another important difference from 
traditional criminal law and correctionalist criminology outlooks. Provisions 
that employ civil techniques – such as confiscation  or taxation of the proceeds 
of crime - are not designed to re-orientate human behaviour or to reintegrate 
those that are deviant. The civil tools employed against him dismantled the 
enterprise by removing money, property, laundering units, and equipment. This 
was further buttressed by a tax demand. Taxation practices in a criminal setting 
are largely agnostic to the wrongdoer’s personality, environment, associations, 
family background, opportunities, or to the State’s complicity in his or her 
wrongdoing.65 
This approach to wrongdoing manages disturbances according to risk principles. 
It attempts to permanently alter the social, financial and physical structures 
around the individual – the enterprise, its financial structures, its working 
capital, and the proceeds arising therefrom. It assumes that the transformative 
individual effects of criminal law are quite limited. It is in this sense an adaptive 
response, a recognition that traditional crime enforcement agencies can no 
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longer win the ‘war on crime’.66 It accepts that crime is a normal social 
phenomenon,  something which is with us, and which needs to be managed as 
efficiently as possible. Moreover, by not seeking to change the individual, and 
by using civil and regulatory strategies, there is minimal potential for 
resistance.67   
This approach to wrongdoing also bypasses professional social expertise. 
Taxing the proceeds of crime does not require the knowledge of social experts 
such as probation officers, psychiatrists, counsellors, psychologists, 
educationalists, correctionalist criminologists, or social workers.68 It embraces 
instead new forms of expertise - accountants, auditors, tax consultants, lawyers, 
estate agents, data analysts, bankers, and financial consultants. None of these 
forms of expertise are orientated to ‘normalising’ the wrongdoer.69 
 
3. The Expressive Power of the Leviathan State  
Another feature of the transformation has been the creation and increased use of 
specialist agencies in the detection and prosecution of white collar crime and the 
grant of extensive powers to such agencies. Despite the existence of an 
extensive catalogue of criminal offences focused on white collar crime in 
Ireland in the twentieth century,70 perpetrators had “little reason to fear 
detection or prosecution.  As far as enforcement is concerned, the sound of the 
enforcer’s footsteps on the beat is simply never heard.”71 The state response has 
been varied and has included the delegation of power to a wide range of 
specialist agencies. These agencies have been endowed with wide investigative 
powers, including very wide powers of entry, inspection, examination, search, 
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seizure and analysis to some of these agencies. For example, under the 2014 
Companies Act 2014 the Director of Corporate Enforcement has the power to 
require a company to produce for inspection specified books and documents in 
circumstances which suggest that fraud, illegality, or prejudice may have 
occurred72and to obtain a search warrant to enter and search premises and seize 
and retain any material information found on the premises or in the custody or 
possession of any person found on the premises.73 This expansion of power to 
decentralised and powerful specialist administrative agencies is occurring at a 
time when the sanctions available for regulatory breaches also appear to be 
gaining strength. 
There is some evidence of a possible drift towards a more punitive approach to 
regulation in this jurisdiction.74 Traditionally it had been said that the focus of 
the sanctions for many of these regulatory offences was more ‘apersonal’ in 
nature than their ordinary counterparts. The argument was that ‘these were not 
real crimes to which stigma should attach, but were rather in the nature of 
administrative regulations with non-stigmatising penalties such as fines’.75 The 
traditional lack of a mens rea requirement operated as the ‘doctrinal marker of 
these defendants less than fully criminal status from a social point of view’.76 
But regulatory agencies have increasingly grown considerable teeth as regards 
prosecution. For example, section 78 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
Act, 2005 now imposes on conviction on indictment for an offence under the 
Act a fine not exceeding €3 million or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years, or both.77 Following an extensive review by the Company Law 
Review Group and the Director of Corporate Enforcement of the several 
hundred criminal offences contained in the Companies Acts, Section 871 of the 
Companies Act 2014 created a four-tier categorisation of company law criminal 
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offences.78 When prosecuted on indictment, category 2 offences are punishable 
by a fine of up to €50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years and category 
1 offences will be punishable by a fine of up to €500,000 and/or a sentence of 
imprisonment of up to ten years.79 The approach evidences both a streamlining 
of the process and a strong punitive response.   
 
However, the trends towards the extension of state power and increased 
punativeness are not universal as demonstrated by the failure of successive 
governments to implement legislation on corporate manslaughter despite calls 
for legislation for over a decade. The Law Reform Commission published a 
report on corporate killing in 2006 and called for the introduction of two new 
offences: a statutory offence of corporate manslaughter for corporate entities; 
and, a secondary offence (grossly negligent management causing death) for 
corporate officers who play a role in the commission of the offence.80 Despite 
successive attempts,81 the legislature has yet to enact legislation giving effect to 
this recommendation, signalling that the commitment of the legislature to the 
punitive ideal is not complete.82 
 
While the general trend has been towards an increase in the sanctions available 
against those guilty of crime of this nature, there is also evidence of a change in 
judicial attitudes to the application of those sanctions, particularly the 
imposition of custodial sentences upon those convicted. McGrath noted in 2012 
that “[c]orporate crime is rarely considered to be as harmful as ordinary 
crime”,83 however, a series of recent cases may indicate an increasing 
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willingness to imprison individuals convicted of serious corporate crime.84 In 
late March of 2009, Mr Justice McKechnie, in a judgment in the Central 
Criminal Court which considered competition law abuses by an association of 
Citroen car dealers, noted: ‘If previously our society did not frown upon this 
type of conduct, as it did in respect of more conventional crime, that 
forbearance or tolerance has eroded swiftly, as the benefits of competition law 
become clearer…Therefore it must be realised that serious breaches of the code 
have to attract serious punishment [which included imprisonment]’.85 In the 
case of Paul Begley v. DPP86 the CCA rejected the contention that cases 
involving tax evasion should be categorised separately from other offences for 
sentencing purposes.87 Instead, “there will be some cases where an immediate 
sentence is justified and others where it will not be.” 88 Ultimately, Mr. Begley’s 
6 year sentence for offences relating to the fraudulent evasion of customs duty 
was reduced to two years by the CCA.89  There have been other notable high 
profile cases in recent times in which lengthy custodial sentences have been 
imposed including a case involving former solicitor, Thomas Byrne, who was 
convicted of 52 offences including theft, forgery and using a false instrument 
and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, with four years suspended.90 More 
recently, in 2015, three former Anglo Irish Bank officials were jailed for 
between three years and 18 months for conspiring to conceal or alter bank 
accounts being sought by the Revenue Commissioners.91 In reaching his 
decision, the judge noted the difficulty in dealing with defendants of previously 
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impeccably good character and stated that the challenge to the court was to 
balance the interests of the accused and the public interest.   
 
Despite this trend towards imprisonment, a custodial sentence was not imposed 
in the high profile case in 2014 involving two former Anglo Irish Bank 
directors, Pat Whelan and Willie McAteer. Upon conviction of offences relating 
to the illegal purchase of Anglo Irish shares under section 60 of the Companies 
Act 1963 the men were sentenced to 240 hours community service.92 Similarly, 
in Ireland’s first bid-rigging cartel case, the Central Criminal Court imposed a 
fine of €7,500 (or three weeks wages) on an individual responsible for a bid-
rigging cartel in the commercial flooring industry which continued for over two 
years. The undertaking was also fined €10,000 in circumstances where the value 
of the rigged tenders were over €500,000. The maximum fine available to the 
court was €5 million or 10 per cent of turnover (whichever was the higher) 
and/or a maximum gaol sentence of 10 years. The DPP has lodged an appeal 
against these sentences on grounds of undue leniency and Groneki  has 
suggested that the “sentences seriously undermines the effective enforcement of 
competition law in Ireland….If the sentences imposed by the Central Criminal 
Court are not successfully appealed as being unduly lenient and appropriate 
sentencing guidelines developed, then the prospect for competition law 
enforcement in Ireland is grim.”93 
 
Though all of this constitutes evidence of a drift towards the greater use or 
threatened use of criminal sanctions, it should not be pushed too far. The area of 
regulatory crime still, by and large, remains predominantly orientated towards a 
compliance model of enforcement.94 This is facilitated by a wide range of 
strategies that favour the employment of negotiation, consultation and 
persuasion, rather than an exclusively sanctioning approach that would 
potentially polarize the various parties involved. These strategies include audits, 
warning letters, notices, injunctions, guidance, binding directions, and the 
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suspension and revocation of licences. The Consumer Protection Act 2007, for 
example, permits the National Consumer Agency to issue prohibition orders to 
businesses, to take undertakings of compliance, to issue compliance notices and 
fixed payment penalties, in addition to prosecution functions. 95 Many agencies 
resolve most issues of non-compliance without the need for further enforcement 
actions. For example, in the years 2009-2012, there were on average 900 court 
prosecutions brought and 12,000 enforcement actions each year by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).96All of these ensure that prosecutions 
remain relatively rare, employed as a last resort mechanism. As Professor Colin 
Scott has recently noted: 
The enforcement strategies of agencies have been arrayed in a pyramidal 
approach to enforcement in which the object is to maintain as much 
enforcement activity as possible at the base of the pyramid. This approach is 
said to be effective not only with businesses which are orientated to legal 
compliance, but also with the ‘amoral calculators’ for whom compliance 
becomes the least costly path when they know there is a credible threat of 
escalation to more stringent sanctions.97 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the landscape has changed almost beyond recognition. Our 
understanding of white collar crime as relatively benign, with weak 
enforcement mechanisms and little will to investigate or punish, has not 
survived.  A wide variety of civil, administrative and regulatory mechanisms are 
now being utilised alongside criminal law instruments in the prosecution of 
such crimes, crimes which are being investigated and prosecuted by specialist 
agencies. In addition to a growing decentralisation of investigative and 
prosecutorial powers, there has also been a decline in the relative power of 
sovereign nations when ranged against large and/or sophisticated corporations 
and this has reshaped how we understand the state/accused relationship. Sharing 
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of information between government agencies involved in the investigation of 
crime and the ability of investigative agencies to compel the production of 
information, alter the investigation of such crimes and mark them out for the 
investigation and prosecution of ‘traditional’ crime. All of this has occurred at a 
time when the evidence of a more punitive approach to regulation in this 
jurisdiction has emerged and suggests that the white collar criminal will not be 
able to escape notice and sanction quite so easily in the future. 
 
 
